

Who Supervises the Supervisors: Between Public Complaints and Legal Certainty ?



Mochammad Hasan ^{a,*}, Suparji ^a, Aris Machmud ^a, Wawan Munawar ^a, Mochamad Choirul Huda ^a

^a Faculty of Law, Universitas Al Azhar, Jakarta, Indonesia.

* corresponding author: hasanwl2002@gmail.com

ARTICLE INFO

Article history

Received: October 16, 2025

Revised: July 10, 2026

Accepted: July 25, 2026

Keywords

Certainty;

Complaints;

Police;

Supervisor;

ABSTRACT

Effective supervision of criminal investigations is essential to ensure accountability, legal certainty, and the protection of individual rights within the criminal justice system. However, the institutional placement of the Bureau for Investigation Supervision within the Criminal Investigation Agency raises concerns regarding supervisory independence and the effective resolution of public complaints. This study examines the effectiveness of investigation supervision in handling public complaints, identifies institutional constraints on independent oversight, and develops an institutional model for strengthening investigative accountability. The research employs normative legal research through statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, supported by institutional documents, complaint data, and interviews with relevant officials and legal practitioners. The study produces three principal findings. First, substantive public complaints remained consistently high, reaching 3,488 cases in 2023, 3,782 in 2024, and 3,770 in 2025, while substantive supervisory activities represented approximately 47.5 percent, 44.5 percent, and 49.9 percent respectively, indicating a persistent gap between supervisory demand and institutional response. Second, structural dependence within the investigative hierarchy, limited authority to enforce supervisory recommendations, and inconsistent complaint resolution weaken supervisory independence and undermine legal certainty. Third, effective reform requires transforming the Bureau into an independent Investigation Supervision Division that reports directly to the Chief of the Indonesian National Police and operates through an integrated supervisory structure at national, regional, and district levels. The proposed institutional reconstruction would strengthen supervisory independence, ensure effective corrective action, improve investigative accountability, and provide greater legal certainty for individuals seeking justice.



This is an open-access article under the [CC-BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) license.



Introduction

A modern state governed by the rule of law requires a law enforcement system that ensures not only procedural compliance but also substantive justice for every citizen.¹ Justice provides the fundamental basis for legal legitimacy and requires

¹ Steven Van Roosbroek and Steven Van de Walle, 'The Relationship between Ombudsman, Government, and Citizens: A Survey Analysis', *Negotiation Journal*, 24.3 (2008), 287–302 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00185.x>

law enforcement institutions to protect individual rights, guarantee legal certainty, and respond to societal expectations. Within the Indonesian criminal justice system, the Indonesian National Police perform a decisive role because investigators exercise extensive authority during the initial stages of criminal proceedings. This strategic position requires police investigators to exercise their authority professionally, transparently, accountably, and fairly. Effective law enforcement, however, depends on an internal supervisory mechanism that can evaluate investigative conduct independently and objectively.² The Bureau for Investigation Supervision, commonly known as Biro Wassidik, performs this supervisory function within the Criminal Investigation Agency. Its current institutional position creates a significant structural problem because the supervisory body remains within the same organizational hierarchy as the investigative units that it supervises. This arrangement may create conflicts of interest, restrict institutional independence, weaken objective oversight, and increase the risk of improper intervention or abuse of investigative authority.³

These structural limitations become particularly significant in handling public complaints concerning investigative performance. Public complaints frequently reflect dissatisfaction with investigative procedures, prolonged case resolution, perceived unfairness, and uncertainty regarding legal outcomes.⁴ Although Biro Wassidik addresses these complaints through assistance, supervision, and special case reviews, institutional dependence may reduce the credibility and effectiveness of these mechanisms.⁵ Weak supervision can subsequently undermine investigator accountability and diminish public confidence in police institutions and the criminal justice system. Police reform therefore requires institutional restructuring that strengthens the independence, authority, transparency, and accountability of investigative supervision.⁶ Transforming Biro Wassidik into an independent supervisory institution could reduce structural conflicts of interest, strengthen protection against abuse of authority, improve the resolution of public complaints, and reinforce public confidence. Such institutional reform could establish a more responsive system of investigative supervision that promotes substantive justice,

² Graham Smith, 'Every Complaint Matters: Human Rights Commissioner's Opinion Concerning Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints against the Police', *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 38.2 (2010), 59–74 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcrj.2010.03.001>

³ David G. Mayes, 'Who Pays for Bank Insolvency in Transition and Emerging Economies?', *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 29.1 (2005), 161–81 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.020>

⁴ Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn, 'Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand?', *The North American Journal of Economics and Finance*, 19.2 (2008), 153–73 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2008.02.002>

⁵ Surinder K. Shukla, 'Conflict Management and Resolution', in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict* (Elsevier, 2022), pp. 213–24 <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-820195-4.00164-3>

⁶ David J Scott, 'Understanding and Coping with Complaints: A Clinician's View', *Current Paediatrics*, 13.5 (2003), 376–81 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0957-5839\(03\)00059-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0957-5839(03)00059-9)

legal certainty, professional accountability, and legitimate law enforcement within Indonesia.⁷

Table 1. Public Complaints and Investigation Supervision by Biro Wassidik, 2020–2025

Year	Public Complaints	Supervision Orders	Progress Reports Requested	SP2HP2/SP3D	Assistance	Supervision	Special Case Review	Case Referral	Preliminary Examination
2020	1,374	940	61	1,132	834	27	99	163	0
2021	3,848	3,467	3,265	3,598	99	194	227	40	1
2022	6,458	6,305	5,478	6,266	643	201	183	93	1
2023	6,038	3,385	3,334	3,377	1,228	245	184	120	0
2024	5,292	3,449	3,229	3,423	1,355	190	137	55	0
2025	5,212	3,601	3,477	3,479	873	856	154	277	0

Source: Research data processed from Biro Wassidik Bareskrim Polri institutional data, 2020–2025.

The empirical data demonstrate significant changes in the volume of public complaints and the supervisory responses undertaken by Biro Wassidik between 2020 and 2025. Public complaints increased substantially from 1,374 cases in 2020 to 3,848 cases in 2021 and reached their highest level at 6,458 cases in 2022. Although the number subsequently declined to 6,038 cases in 2023, 5,292 cases in 2024, and 5,212 cases in 2025, the volume remained considerably higher than the level recorded in 2020. Between the 2022 peak and 2025, public complaints decreased by approximately 19.3 percent. This trend indicates that public dissatisfaction concerning investigative processes remained a significant issue despite the gradual decline in the number of complaints. The data also reveal an important transformation in the pattern of supervisory intervention. In 2025, Biro Wassidik issued 3,601 supervision orders, requested 3,477 progress reports, and processed 3,479 matters through the SP2HP2 or SP3D mechanism. More importantly, direct supervision increased sharply from 190 cases in 2024 to 856 cases in 2025, representing an increase of approximately 350.5 percent. Case referrals also increased from 55 cases to 277 cases during the same period, equivalent to an increase of approximately 403.6 percent. These developments suggest a shift toward more intensive supervisory intervention in responding to problems arising from criminal investigations. However, the persistence of more than five thousand public complaints annually in 2024 and 2025 demonstrates that internal supervisory mechanisms continue to face substantial institutional challenges.

The Indonesian National Police recently strengthened the regulatory framework for managing public complaints by establishing an integrated mechanism that governs the receipt, examination, follow up, monitoring, and resolution of complaints.⁸ This regulatory development provides a stronger

⁷ Yu-Lin Huang and Shih-Hung Chang, 'Design Professionals' Legal Risks Increased under Nature's Attack: Chichi Earthquake Experience', *International Journal of Project Management*, 27.6 (2009), 544–51 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.10.008>

⁸ Ian Waters and Katie Brown, 'Police Complaints and the Complainants' Experience', *British Journal of Criminology*, 40.4 (2000), 617 – 638 <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/40.4.617>

procedural foundation for responding to public concerns regarding police performance. Nevertheless, procedural improvement alone cannot guarantee effective investigation supervision. The current institutional position of the Bureau for Investigation Supervision, known as Biro Wassidik, continues to raise concerns regarding its capacity to exercise independent and objective supervision, particularly when implementing preventive, repressive, and corrective measures against irregularities in criminal investigations.^{9v}

A modern state governed by the rule of law requires law enforcement institutions to pursue substantive justice rather than limit their responsibilities to procedural compliance. Within the Indonesian criminal justice system, the police exercise extensive authority during the investigation process and therefore carry a substantial responsibility to ensure professionalism, transparency, accountability, fairness, and respect for individual rights.¹⁰ Effective supervision becomes essential because investigative authority can significantly affect personal liberty, access to justice, and the outcome of criminal proceedings. An effective supervisory institution must therefore possess sufficient authority and institutional autonomy to scrutinize investigative practices without organizational pressure or interference.¹¹

The existing organizational structure presents a fundamental institutional challenge because Biro Wassidik remains situated within the Criminal Investigation Agency, while simultaneously supervising investigative activities conducted within that organizational environment. This institutional arrangement may create conflicts of interest because the supervisory body operates within the same command structure as the units subject to its scrutiny. Such dependence can restrict objective decision making, weaken supervisory authority, and reduce public confidence in the impartiality of complaint resolution. Indonesian experience with independent oversight institutions demonstrates that structural and operational autonomy can strengthen the credibility of institutional supervision. These experiences provide an important foundation for reconsidering the organizational position of Biro Wassidik.¹²

This study therefore proposes transforming Biro Wassidik into an autonomous Investigation Supervision Division with an institutional position equivalent to the General Supervision Inspectorate. The proposed division should exercise independent authority over investigation supervision and report directly to the

⁹ Tom R Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law*, Why People Obey the Law, 2021 <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1j66769>

¹⁰ Richard Young and others, 'Informal Resolution of Complaints against the Police: A Quasi-Experimental Test of Restorative Justice', *Criminal Justice*, 5.3 (2005), 279 – 317 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1466802505055837>

¹¹ Jonathan Jackson and others, 'Why Do People Comply with the Law?', *British Journal of Criminology*, 52.6 (2012), 1051 – 1071 <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azs032>

¹² Eugene A Paoline, Stephanie M Myers and Robert E Worden, 'Police Culture, Individualism, and Community Policing: Evidence from Two Police Departments', *Justice Quarterly*, 17.3 (2000), 576 – 605 <https://doi.org/10.1080/07418820000094671>

Chief of the Indonesian National Police.¹³ This institutional arrangement would separate supervisory functions from operational investigation structures and reduce opportunities for intervention by the units under examination. The reform should also strengthen coordination with external oversight institutions, particularly the National Police Commission and other relevant accountability bodies. Effective coordination between internal and external supervision can create complementary accountability mechanisms while preventing overlapping authority.¹⁴

The proposed institutional model incorporates three interconnected dimensions of supervision. First, preventive supervision should establish an early warning system capable of identifying procedural irregularities, unreasonable delays, conflicts of interest, and potential abuses of investigative authority before they develop into serious violations. Second, repressive supervision should authorize independent internal investigations when public complaints or supervisory findings indicate possible professional or legal misconduct. Third, corrective supervision should require systematic evaluation, professional development, institutional improvement, and measurable follow up after supervisory findings. Combining these dimensions would transform supervision from a predominantly reactive mechanism into a comprehensive system that prevents, investigates, and corrects deficiencies in investigative practices.¹⁵

The model should also incorporate the principle of ethical parity by ensuring that investigators who commit comparable violations receive equivalent treatment regardless of rank, position, institutional influence, or professional status. Consistent enforcement of ethical standards can strengthen organizational integrity because accountability loses credibility when institutional hierarchy determines the consequences of misconduct. Fair and consistent supervisory practices would consequently reinforce professional responsibility while increasing public confidence in police accountability.¹⁶ Digital transformation and increasingly complex forms of crime further strengthen the urgency of institutional reform. Contemporary investigations require sophisticated investigative methods, digital evidence management, rapid coordination, and increasingly specialized professional competence. These developments

¹³ Muhammad Firdaus, Chryshnanda Dwilaksana and Muhammad Daffa Auliarizky Onielda, 'Shifting Polri's Law Enforcement Strategy: Restorative Justice for Public Trust', *Jurnal Media Hukum*, 30.2 (2023), 153 – 170 <https://doi.org/10.18196/jmh.v30i2.18628>

¹⁴ Sahuri Lasmadi, 'Issuance of a Search Warrant for Narcotics Crime in Indonesia', *Law Reform: Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum*, 16.1 (2020), 45 – 57 <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v16i1.30304>

¹⁵ Wahyu Purbiyantari and others, 'Leadership and Service in the Police Context_A Qualitative Study', *International Journal of Membrane Science and Technology*, 10.2 (2023), 846 – 856 <https://doi.org/10.15379/ijmst.v10i2.1390>

¹⁶ Jacqui Baker, *THE INDONESIAN POLICE*, Routledge Handbook of Indonesian Law, 2026 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032709840-5>

simultaneously create new risks of procedural error, inappropriate intervention, misuse of authority, and ineffective case management.¹⁷

Public complaint data therefore provide an important empirical instrument for evaluating the quality of investigative supervision. A decline in the number of complaints should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of successful supervision. Evaluation should also examine the quality, timeliness, transparency, consistency, and substantive outcomes of complaint resolution. Investigation supervision currently operates through several organizational levels, from national police headquarters to regional and local police institutions. This multilayered structure can strengthen supervisory reach, but its effectiveness depends on clear authority, transparent reporting, institutional coordination, and consistent implementation. Complaint progress notifications can improve transparency by enabling complainants to understand how supervisory authorities handle their cases. However, procedural transparency must operate alongside substantive independence because reporting mechanisms alone cannot guarantee impartial supervision.¹⁸

Transforming Biro Wassidik into an autonomous Investigation Supervision Division therefore represents more than an organizational restructuring. It constitutes a shift from hierarchical administrative supervision toward substantive institutional accountability. By combining institutional independence, preventive detection, independent examination, corrective intervention, ethical parity, transparent complaint management, and coordination with external oversight bodies, the proposed model could strengthen the integrity of criminal investigations. Ultimately, this transformation could improve internal police accountability, enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system, protect the rule of law, and promote a more responsive, professional, and substantively just system of law enforcement in Indonesia.¹⁹

This study aims to examine the legal and institutional position of Public Complaints (DUMAS) within the supervision of criminal investigations conducted by the Indonesian National Police and to evaluate their effectiveness in ensuring legal certainty, accountability, and fairness in the investigation process. The study specifically analyzes the authority and institutional position of Biro Wassidik in managing and supervising public complaints, identifies structural and practical weaknesses that may affect the independence and objectivity of investigation

¹⁷ Budiyo, 'Counterterrorism in Indonesia: The Police Role in Ensuring Security', *Pakistan Journal of Criminology*, 16.2 (2024), 733 – 741 <https://doi.org/10.62271/pjc.16.2.733.741>

¹⁸ Dani Durahman, Edi Setiadi and Rusli Iskandar, 'Efforts to Build the Integrity of Investigators to Realize Just Law Enforcement', *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues*, 24.Special Issue 1 (2021), 1 – 7 <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85112857480&partnerID=40&md5=0b07b64db4c9ed22cacc6e4d83f68825>

¹⁹ Jumadi and others, 'Police Legal Responsibility For Crime and Theft Involving Violence', *Nurani*, 23.1 (2023), 141 – 152 <https://doi.org/10.19109/nurani.v23i1.14177>

supervision, and assesses whether the existing complaint mechanism provides effective legal certainty for complainants and parties involved in criminal proceedings. Furthermore, this study seeks to formulate an institutional model for strengthening investigation supervision through greater supervisory independence, transparent complaint management, preventive supervision, effective examination of alleged irregularities, and corrective measures. Ultimately, the research proposes a more accountable and independent framework for managing DUMAS that can strengthen professional investigation practices, prevent abuse of authority, ensure consistent complaint resolution, and enhance public confidence in the Indonesian criminal justice system.

Research Method

This study adopts a normative legal research method to examine the legal and institutional position of Public Complaints (DUMAS) within the supervision of criminal investigations conducted by the Indonesian National Police. The research treats law as an integrated system of legal norms, principles, institutional powers, and regulatory standards that determine the operation and accountability of investigation supervision. It applies statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. The statutory approach examines the legal framework governing police authority, public complaint management, investigation supervision, and the institutional authority of Biro Wassidik. The conceptual approach analyzes legal certainty, supervisory independence, institutional accountability, and effective oversight to establish the conceptual basis for evaluating the existing system. The case approach examines relevant complaint cases and supervisory practices to determine how legal norms operate within actual investigation supervision and whether their implementation provides adequate legal certainty.²⁰

The research primarily uses secondary legal materials derived from legislation, police regulations, standard operating procedures, institutional documents, Biro Wassidik performance reports, public complaint statistics, scholarly books, journal articles, and relevant research findings. The study also uses information obtained from interviews with relevant officials and practitioners when necessary to clarify supervisory practices and support the interpretation of documentary materials. The research systematically identifies, classifies, and examines these materials according to their relevance to supervisory authority, institutional independence, procedural accountability, and the resolution of public complaints.²¹ The study applies qualitative legal analysis using descriptive and analytical reasoning. The analytical process begins by identifying the legal norms governing DUMAS and

²⁰ Arnapi and others, 'Paradigma Hukum Kedudukan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Pengamanan Aksi Unjuk Rasa', *Media Iuris*, 7.1 (2024), 31 – 50 <https://doi.org/10.20473/mi.v7i1.43709>

²¹ Eko Suprihanto, Yos Johan Utama and Irma Cahyaningtyas, 'Reformulasi Pemberantasan Korupsi Di Indonesia: Perspektif Kepolisian Menghadapi Korupsi Sebagai Ancaman Perang Proksi', *Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia*, 5.1 (2023), 204 – 219 <https://doi.org/10.14710/jphi.v5i1.204-219>

investigation supervision. It then examines the coherence of these norms, evaluates their institutional implications, and assesses their implementation within existing supervisory practices. The research compares the regulatory framework with actual supervisory practices to identify legal gaps, institutional weaknesses, and inconsistencies that may affect legal certainty. Grammatical, systematic, and conceptual interpretation supports the examination of the meaning, relationship, and purpose of the relevant legal provisions. The study also analyzes complaint statistics and institutional practices to assess the timeliness, transparency, impartiality, and accountability of complaint resolution.²²

Results and Discussion

Beyond Internal Control Toward Independent Investigation Supervision

Empirical data on public complaints handled by the Bureau for Investigation Supervision between 2020 and 2025 reveal substantial changes in both complaint volume and institutional responses to problems arising from criminal investigations. The Bureau received 1,374 complaints in 2020, while the number increased sharply to 3,848 in 2021 and reached 6,458 in 2022. Complaints subsequently declined to 6,038 in 2023. After excluding 2,544 duplicate submissions, the Bureau identified 3,488 substantive complaints. In 2024, the Bureau received 5,292 complaints, comprising 1,510 duplicate submissions and 3,782 substantive complaints. The figure declined slightly to 5,212 in 2025, consisting of 1,442 duplicate submissions and 3,770 substantive complaints. This pattern demonstrates that the overall volume of complaints declined after 2022, while substantive complaints remained consistently high.

A closer examination of the data provides a more meaningful picture of supervisory performance. Total complaints decreased by approximately 19.3 percent from 6,458 in 2022 to 5,212 in 2025. However, substantive complaints remained within a relatively narrow range between 2023 and 2025. They increased from 3,488 in 2023 to 3,782 in 2024 before decreasing slightly to 3,770 in 2025. The persistence of substantive complaints suggests that the problems that encourage citizens to challenge investigative practices have not declined at the same rate as the overall number of submissions. The reduction in total complaints primarily reflects fewer duplicate submissions rather than a substantial reduction in grievances concerning criminal investigations. Improved digital registration and complaint identification may have enabled the supervisory system to detect repeated submissions more effectively. Consequently, a decline in aggregate

²² Siti Sumiati and Verri Dwi Prasetyo, 'Transformational Performance of Police of the Republic of Indonesia Through Smart Working', *Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems*, 497 LNNS (2022), 325 – 336 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08812-4_31

complaints should not serve as the sole indicator of improved investigative performance.²³

Several developments may explain the substantial increase in complaints during the observed period. Digital complaint services expanded public access to formal supervisory mechanisms and reduced administrative barriers that previously limited participation. Greater legal awareness and digital literacy also enabled citizens to identify complaint mechanisms as an avenue for questioning procedural irregularities, prolonged investigations, inappropriate investigative conduct, and uncertainty regarding case progression. At the same time, public scrutiny of police conduct intensified following widely discussed incidents involving serious misconduct by individual officers. These circumstances increased public demands for transparency and institutional accountability. The growth in complaints therefore carries a dual meaning. It may indicate persistent weaknesses in investigative practices, but it may also demonstrate greater public awareness and willingness to use formal accountability mechanisms.²⁴

Institutional data for 2023 to 2025 reinforce this interpretation. At the central level, the supervisory authority recorded approximately 6,032 complaints in 2023, including 3,556 substantive complaints. In 2024, it recorded approximately 5,301 complaints, of which 3,766 represented substantive complaints. Data available for part of 2025 recorded 1,583 complaints, including 1,257 substantive complaints. The partial nature of the 2025 data prevents a direct comparison with complete annual figures for previous years. Nevertheless, the substantial proportion of substantive complaints indicates that investigative practices continued to generate considerable demand for institutional supervision. Regional data reveal a different pattern. Regional police institutions recorded 3,193 complaints in 2023, followed by a sharp decline to 1,412 in 2024 and a modest increase to 1,450 in 2025. The metropolitan police jurisdiction consistently recorded the largest number of complaints, with 810 cases in 2023, 373 in 2024, and 396 in 2025. Regional police institutions in North Sumatra and East Java also recorded comparatively high numbers. This geographical variation demonstrates that national complaint statistics alone cannot fully explain the effectiveness of investigation supervision. Differences in investigative workload, population size, crime patterns, institutional capacity, access to complaint mechanisms, and organizational practices may shape complaint patterns across police jurisdictions.²⁵

²³ Amostian, Yusriyadi and Ana Silviana, 'Reformasi Polri Melalui Penguatan Fungsi Dan Kewenangan Komisi Kepolisian Nasional Dalam Melakukan Pengawasan Eksternal Terhadap Polri', *Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia*, 5.3 (2023), 510 – 522 <https://doi.org/10.14710/jphi.v5i3.510-522>

²⁴ Sarah Nuraini Siregar, 'Politicised Policing in Indonesia: A Study of the Indonesian National Police during the 2019 Presidential Election', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 33.3 (2025), 654 – 672 <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2025.2500005>

²⁵ Barkah Rosadi and others, 'THE EFFECT OF SAFETY UNIT COMPETENCY OF SERVICE PERFORMANCE IN THE GEOLOGICAL SECRETARIAT OF THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES; [PENGARUH KOMPETENSI SATUAN PENGAMANAN TERHADAP KINERJA

A comparison among supervisory institutions further demonstrates the increasingly prominent role of the Bureau in handling complaints concerning criminal investigations. Complaints submitted to the Bureau increased from 4,307 in 2023 to 4,935 in 2024, representing growth of approximately 14.6 percent. In contrast, complaints submitted to the General Supervision Inspectorate decreased from 2,569 to 2,378, while complaints submitted to the National Police Commission declined from 2,031 to 1,496. These contrasting trends suggest that citizens increasingly identify the Bureau as the principal institutional channel for addressing problems associated with criminal investigations. However, greater use of this mechanism does not necessarily establish greater supervisory effectiveness. The increase may reflect stronger public recognition of the Bureau while simultaneously revealing the continuing prevalence of investigative problems.²⁶

The substance of the complaints provides stronger evidence of these institutional challenges. Complaints concerning technical and tactical aspects of investigations increased from 2,518 cases in 2023 to 3,486 cases in 2024, representing growth of approximately 38.4 percent. Complaints concerning delays in case handling remained another significant category, although their number declined from 1,564 cases in 2023 to 1,374 cases in 2024. The predominance of these categories indicates that public dissatisfaction primarily concerns how investigators exercise procedural authority, manage criminal cases, and provide certainty regarding investigative progress. These findings therefore identify investigative procedure and timely case resolution as central areas requiring stronger supervision.

The empirical findings reveal a fundamental distinction between administrative performance and substantive supervisory effectiveness. Administrative indicators measure the number of complaints received, registered, processed, or completed, while substantive effectiveness concerns whether supervision actually resolves investigative irregularities and protects the rights of affected parties. A reduction in total complaints cannot demonstrate effective supervision when substantive complaints remain consistently high. Similarly, processing a large number of complaints does not necessarily guarantee accountability if supervisory findings fail to produce timely decisions, corrective action, or meaningful remedies. Evaluation of supervisory performance should therefore consider the quality and consequences of complaint resolution rather than relying primarily on quantitative outputs.²⁷

PELAYANAN PADA SEKRETARIAT BADAN GEOLOGI KEMENTERIAN ENERGI', *Res Militaris*, 13.1 (2023), 10 – 28 <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85141420642&partnerID=40&md5=be357364036f5abd28bf94731023c872>

²⁶ Aris Irawan and others, 'The Role of Institutionalization Police Support in Emergency Situation: Evidence from Indonesia', *Journal of Human Rights, Culture and Legal System*, 3.1 (2023), 109 – 133 <https://doi.org/10.53955/jhcls.v3i1.80>

²⁷ Rochmad Rochmad and Raden Ariel Andro Bramasta, 'Prevention of Theft with Aggravated Circumstances at Semarang City', *Indonesian Journal of Advocacy and Legal Services*, 5.1 (2023), 81 – 117 <https://doi.org/10.15294/ijals.v5i1.66854>

This distinction directly affects legal certainty. Public access to a complaint mechanism provides procedural protection, but access alone does not guarantee a predictable and effective legal outcome. Legal certainty requires the supervisory institution to examine complaints within a reasonable period, evaluate allegations impartially, communicate progress transparently, provide clear decisions, and ensure compliance with corrective measures. A complaint mechanism that formally receives grievances but cannot ensure their effective resolution risks producing administrative certainty without substantive legal certainty. The persistence of complaints concerning procedural irregularities and delayed investigations demonstrates the importance of evaluating whether supervisory intervention produces tangible improvements in investigative conduct. The findings ultimately expose a deeper institutional problem concerning the position of the supervisory authority itself. Citizens increasingly rely on the Bureau to examine problems arising from criminal investigations, yet the Bureau remains institutionally connected to the organizational structure responsible for conducting those investigations. This arrangement raises questions concerning independence, impartiality, and the capacity of supervisors to scrutinize investigative conduct without institutional influence. Expanding digital complaint services and improving administrative procedures can strengthen accessibility and efficiency, but these measures cannot independently resolve structural limitations within the supervisory system.²⁸

The central challenge lies not simply in reducing the number of public complaints but in ensuring that supervision produces legal certainty through independent examination, transparent decisions, effective corrective measures, and institutional accountability. The empirical evidence supports a transition from complaint administration toward substantive investigation supervision. Such a transformation requires stronger institutional independence, clearer supervisory authority, transparent procedures, measurable resolution standards, and effective mechanisms for implementing supervisory findings. Public complaints can therefore function as more than an administrative channel for expressing dissatisfaction. When supported by independent and accountable supervision, they can become an important mechanism for protecting legal certainty and strengthening the integrity of criminal investigations.²⁹

Evaluating the implementation of investigation supervision requires an assessment of how the Bureau for Investigation Supervision responds to public complaints through assistance, supervision, special case reviews, and case referrals.

²⁸ Haviluddin and others, 'A Performance Comparison of Euclidean, Manhattan and Minkowski Distances in K-Means Clustering', in *2020 6th International Conference on Science in Information Technology: Embracing Industry 4.0: Towards Innovation in Disaster Management, ICSITech 2020*, 2020, pp. 184 – 188 <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSITech49800.2020.9392053>

²⁹ Armunanto Hutahaeen and Erlyn Indarti, 'Implementation of Investigation by the Indonesian National Police in Eradicating Corruption Crime', *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, 23.1 (2020), 136–54 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-12-2018-0075>

The empirical data from 2020 to 2025 reveal considerable variation in the intensity and form of supervisory intervention. In 2020, the Bureau received 1,374 public complaints and conducted 834 assistance activities, 27 supervision activities, 99 special case reviews, and 163 case referrals. In 2021, the number of complaints increased to 3,848, while the Bureau conducted 99 assistance activities, 194 supervision activities, 227 special case reviews, and 40 referrals. In 2022, 6,458 complaints resulted in 643 assistance activities, 201 supervision activities, 183 special case reviews, and 93 referrals. The Bureau subsequently conducted 1,228 assistance activities, 245 supervision activities, 184 special case reviews, and 120 referrals in 2023. In 2024, it recorded 5,292 complaints, including 3,782 substantive complaints, and conducted 1,355 assistance activities, 190 supervision activities, 137 special case reviews, and 55 referrals. In 2025, 5,212 complaints, including 3,770 substantive complaints, resulted in 873 assistance activities, 856 supervision activities, 154 special case reviews, and 277 referrals.

These figures reveal important changes in the relationship between substantive complaints and supervisory intervention. In 2023, the Bureau conducted 1,657 assistance, supervision, and special case review activities in response to 3,488 substantive complaints. These activities represented approximately 47.5 percent of the substantive complaint volume. In 2024, the Bureau conducted 1,682 supervisory activities for 3,782 substantive complaints, equivalent to approximately 44.5 percent. The figure increased to 1,883 activities for 3,770 substantive complaints in 2025, representing approximately 49.9 percent. Although these figures do not necessarily indicate that each supervisory activity corresponded to a separate complaint, they demonstrate that the intensity of substantive supervisory intervention remained considerably lower than the overall volume of substantive complaints.³⁰

The most striking development occurred in 2025, when supervision activities increased from 190 in 2024 to 856. This increase of approximately 350.5 percent marked a significant change in the composition of supervisory responses. At the same time, assistance activities decreased from 1,355 to 873. The data therefore indicate a shift from assistance toward more intensive supervision. This development may reflect an institutional decision to strengthen direct supervisory intervention when consultative measures cannot adequately resolve problems in investigative practice. However, the available quantitative data alone cannot establish whether noncompliance with previous assistance recommendations caused this shift. Establishing such a causal relationship requires evidence

³⁰ Yunita Nurwulantari and Anna Erliyana, 'Considering the Model of Review of Public Official Decisions by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia (Comparative Study of Indonesia and South Korea); [Menimbang Model Pengujian Keputusan Pejabat Publik Oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik I', *Jurnal Konstitusi*, 18.1 (2021), 168 – 194 <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1818>

concerning the reasons for supervisory escalation and the implementation of earlier recommendations.³¹

Case referrals also increased substantially from 55 in 2024 to 277 in 2025, representing an increase of approximately 403.6 percent. This change indicates a greater use of referral mechanisms in handling complaints that required intervention beyond the immediate supervisory process. Nevertheless, referral statistics alone cannot establish whether increasing case complexity caused this development. The finding instead demonstrates that the Bureau increasingly relied on other institutional mechanisms to address matters that could not be resolved through its ordinary supervisory processes.³²

Table 2. Follow Up Measures for Public Complaints, 2022 to 2025

Year	Total Complaints	Duplicate Complaints	Substantive Complaints	Supervision Orders	Progress Reports Requested	Progress Notifications	Assistance	Supervision	Special Case Reviews	Referrals	Preliminary Examinations
2022	6,458	Not available	Not available	6,305	5,478	6,265	643	201	183	93	1
2023	6,038	2,544	3,488	3,385	3,334	3,377	1,228	245	184	120	0
2024	5,292	1,510	3,782	3,449	3,229	3,423	1,355	190	137	55	0
2025	5,212	1,442	3,770	3,601	3,477	3,479	873	856	154	277	0

Source: Research data processed from institutional data on the follow up of public complaints by the Bureau for Investigation Supervision, 2022 to 2025.

The data also reveal a significant distinction between administrative compliance and substantive supervision. In 2025, the Bureau issued 3,601 supervision orders for 3,770 substantive complaints, equivalent to approximately 95.5 percent. It requested 3,477 investigation progress reports, equivalent to 92.2 percent, and issued 3,479 complaint progress notifications, equivalent to approximately 92.3 percent. These figures indicate a high level of administrative implementation during the preliminary stages of complaint supervision. The Bureau therefore demonstrated substantial institutional capacity to register complaints, initiate supervisory procedures, request information, and communicate developments to complainants. A different pattern emerges when the analysis moves from administrative procedures to substantive supervisory intervention. Assistance, supervision, and special case reviews amounted to 1,883 activities in 2025, equivalent to approximately 49.9 percent of substantive complaints. This difference reveals an implementation gap between initiating administrative supervision and undertaking more intensive supervisory measures. The finding requires cautious interpretation because a single supervisory activity may address

³¹ Eny Suastuti and others, 'TRANSFORMATION AND EFFECTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION ON DETERMINING CORRUPTION SUSPECTS AS A PRETRIAL OBJECT UNDER THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM', *Lex Scientia Law Review*, 8.2 (2024), 817 – 858 <https://doi.org/10.15294/lslr.v8i2.14667>

³² Rofingi, Umi Rozah and Adifyan Rahmat Asga, 'Problems of Law Enforcement in Realizing The Principle of Equality Before The Law in Indonesia', *Law Reform: Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum*, 18.2 (2022), 222 – 237 <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v18i2.47477>

more than one complaint, while some complaints may not require assistance, direct supervision, or a special case review. Consequently, the 49.9 percent figure should not automatically be interpreted as evidence that half of all substantive complaints received no follow up. It nevertheless demonstrates that high administrative processing rates do not necessarily correspond with an equivalent level of substantive supervisory intervention.

The significant expansion of direct supervision in 2025 reinforces this distinction. Supervision increased from 245 activities in 2023 to 856 in 2025, despite a relatively stable number of substantive complaints.³³ This pattern indicates that the institution increasingly relied on direct supervision rather than predominantly consultative intervention. The change suggests an important evolution in supervisory strategy because direct supervision enables closer examination of investigative performance and provides greater opportunities to identify procedural deficiencies. However, determining whether this increased intensity produced better investigative outcomes requires additional indicators, particularly the implementation rate of supervisory recommendations, the time required to resolve complaints, the recurrence of similar violations, and the satisfaction of complainants with final outcomes.³⁴

Qualitative findings identify institutional limitations that quantitative indicators cannot fully capture. Interview evidence indicates that the structural position of the supervisory body may restrict its ability to ensure complete implementation of supervisory recommendations. According to the interview findings, investigators or relevant units sometimes implement recommendations only partially, while other recommendations may remain unresolved without clear institutional consequences. This condition demonstrates that the effectiveness of supervision depends not only on the authority to examine complaints and issue recommendations but also on the capacity to ensure compliance with supervisory decisions. A supervisory institution may demonstrate strong administrative performance while remaining unable to produce substantive accountability when its recommendations lack sufficient institutional force.³⁵

Data concerning disciplinary and professional ethical violations among criminal investigation personnel provide additional evidence of implementation

³³ Maulidin, Iskandar A Gani and Efendi, 'PENERAPAN ASAS-ASAS UMUM PEMERINTAHAN YANG BAIK DALAM PEMBERHENTIAN TIDAK DENGAN HORMAT TERHADAP ANGGOTA POLRI', *Jurnal Suara Hukum*, 5.1 (2023), 68 – 88 <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsh.v5n1.p68.20-2088>

³⁴ Hikam Hulwanullah and Torik Abdul Aziz Wibowo, 'Hybrid Multi-Level Constitutional Complaint: Reforming Constitutional Rights Protection in Indonesia', *Constitutional Review*, 12.1 (2026), 264 – 312 <https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev1218>

³⁵ Rio Adhikara and Panji Yugo Putranto, 'Revisiting Police Legitimacy: Exploring Determinants beyond Performance, Procedural Justice, Public Satisfaction, and Its Practices', *Policing and Society*, 36.4 (2026), 494 – 510 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2025.2579623>

challenges. Recorded disciplinary violations reached 316 cases in 2021, declined to 179 in 2022, and then increased to 341 in 2023. Professional ethical violations followed a similar pattern, with 235 cases in 2021, 232 in 2022, and 461 in 2023. Data available for the beginning of 2024 recorded considerably lower figures, but their partial coverage prevents direct comparison with complete annual data. The sharp increase in 2023 remains particularly important because 198 violations concerned failures to perform duties, powers, and responsibilities professionally, proportionately, and procedurally, while 34 involved abuse of authority in the performance of official duties.

These findings demonstrate that existing supervisory arrangements have not completely prevented misconduct within criminal investigation functions. Cases involving improper investigative conduct, abuse of authority, inappropriate treatment of victims, and irregularities involving evidence further illustrate the potential consequences of ineffective supervision. Public discussion of such incidents has also intensified criticism of police accountability and contributed to negative perceptions of investigative institutions.³⁶ The consequences extend beyond individual misconduct because repeated supervisory failures can weaken institutional credibility and reduce public willingness to trust formal criminal justice mechanisms. The findings therefore reveal three interconnected dimensions of the implementation problem. First, the Bureau demonstrates relatively strong administrative capacity in initiating supervision, requesting investigation reports, and communicating complaint progress. Second, the significant increase in direct supervision during 2025 indicates a shift toward more intensive intervention. Third, persistent disciplinary and ethical violations, together with difficulties in ensuring complete implementation of supervisory recommendations, demonstrate that greater supervisory activity does not automatically produce greater supervisory effectiveness.³⁷

The most fundamental challenge confronting the Bureau for Investigation Supervision arises from a structural conflict of interest embedded within its current institutional design. The Bureau operates within the Criminal Investigation Agency while simultaneously exercising supervisory authority over investigators who belong to the same organizational structure. From the perspective of constitutional and administrative law, this arrangement raises concerns regarding the principle of *nemo judex in causa sua*, which requires decision makers to remain impartial and prevents an institution from effectively

³⁶ Adelia Khrisna Putri and others, 'Supporting Healing after Suicide Loss: Development and Validation of the First Co-Designed Resource Booklet for Indonesian Suicide Loss Survivors', *Mental Health & Prevention*, 42 (2026), 200499 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mhp.2026.200499>

³⁷ Ahmad Dwi Nuryanto, Adi Sulistiyono and Pujiono, 'Problem Investigation of Criminal Washing That Came from the Predicate Crime Banking by the Investigator', *International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology*, 29.4 (2020), 1543 – 1549 <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85083047510&partnerID=40&md5=5280944aa993d563067d9b2f77429c68>

judging matters in which it has an institutional interest. The principle becomes particularly relevant when a supervisory body must evaluate the conduct of officials who operate within the same hierarchy, share organizational interests, and ultimately remain accountable within the same chain of command.³⁸

The interview findings reinforce this institutional concern. A senior advocate characterized the position of the Bureau within the Criminal Investigation Agency as an inherent weakness in the architecture of investigation supervision. The interviewee argued that placing investigators and their supervisors within the same institutional structure creates uncertainty regarding whether the supervisory process can operate independently when allegations concern members of that structure. The concern does not necessarily imply that individual supervisors lack professional integrity. Rather, it identifies an institutional condition that may constrain their ability to demonstrate independence and may create reasonable doubts among complainants regarding the impartiality of supervisory decisions.³⁹

The interviewee illustrated this problem by comparing the arrangement to a referee whose institutional relationship with one competing party creates doubts about impartiality regardless of the referee's personal integrity. This analogy highlights an important distinction between actual independence and perceived independence. Effective supervision requires both. Supervisors must possess genuine authority to make decisions without interference, but the institutional arrangement must also convince complainants and the wider public that supervisory decisions result from an impartial process. When the institutional structure itself creates reasonable doubts regarding neutrality, even professionally conducted supervision may struggle to obtain public legitimacy.⁴⁰ This structural problem becomes more significant within a strongly hierarchical organization. Interview findings from a retired senior police officer with extensive experience in criminal investigation and internal supervision identified organizational hierarchy as an important constraint on supervisory independence. Police institutions rely heavily on command structures, professional seniority, organizational loyalty, and formal authority. These characteristics perform legitimate functions in maintaining operational discipline, but they may create difficulties when supervisors must scrutinize investigators who possess equivalent rank, greater organizational influence, or close professional relationships with senior officials. Supervisory effectiveness therefore depends not only on formal legal authority but also on

³⁸ Muchammad Soleh and others, 'Economic Value of near Real-Time Hotspot Data Products for Indonesian Forest and Land Fire Monitoring', *Kuwait Journal of Science*, 53.3 (2026), 100585 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjs.2026.100585>

³⁹ Anup Phayal and others, 'Caught in the Net: Unraveling the Piracy-IUU Fishing Milieu in Indonesian Waters through Survey Data', *Political Geography*, 125 (2026), 103449 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2025.103449>

⁴⁰ Abdul Kadir and others, 'Misaligned Governance in Indonesia's Nickel Boom: Design and Capacity Failures in the Mandiodo Block', *Resources Policy*, 120 (2026), 106018 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2026.106018>

whether the institutional structure enables supervisors to exercise that authority without psychological, hierarchical, or organizational pressure.⁴¹

The qualitative evidence also illustrates how these pressures may influence supervisory outcomes. One interviewee described an incident in which internal supervision allegedly identified serious indications of misconduct by a senior investigator. According to the interview account, sufficient information existed to justify stronger institutional action, but informal organizational influence allegedly encouraged an internal resolution. The investigator ultimately received a transfer rather than a more substantial disciplinary response. As an interview-based finding, this account cannot independently establish a general pattern of institutional misconduct. Nevertheless, it provides important qualitative evidence of how organizational relationships and hierarchical considerations may affect the implementation of supervisory findings.⁴²

This finding also challenges explanations that attribute police misconduct exclusively to individual officers. An individual misconduct perspective treats violations as deviations committed by particular personnel without questioning the broader institutional environment. Such an explanation becomes insufficient when organizational structures fail to detect misconduct, prevent recurrence, ensure accountability, or implement corrective recommendations. Investigation supervision must therefore examine both individual responsibility and the institutional conditions that permit misconduct to occur or remain inadequately addressed. An effective supervisory system should identify problematic conduct at an early stage, impose proportionate consequences, correct procedural weaknesses, and prevent organizational practices from shielding individual violations.⁴³

The structural conflict of interest also affects public perceptions of supervisory credibility. Interview findings from individuals who had experience with the complaint mechanism revealed doubts about whether supervisors could act decisively against investigators working within the same organizational environment. Such perceptions carry significant institutional consequences because public complaint mechanisms depend on citizen confidence. Individuals will have little incentive to report investigative irregularities when they believe

⁴¹ Tuhfatul Mubarakah Assalamah and others, 'Hijab as Credibility Work and the Actionability of Digital Traces among Queer Muslim Women in Indonesia', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 119 (2026), 103384 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2026.103384>

⁴² Ade Suzana Eka Putri and others, 'Gaps in Integrating Public Health into Local Disaster Risk Reduction: Evidence from Indonesia's Pandemic Response in Padang City', *Progress in Disaster Science*, 31 (2026), 100667 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2026.100667>

⁴³ Fransisca Noni Tirtaningtyas, 'Influences of Human Activities on Seabird Populations: Case Example from Jakarta Bay, Indonesia', in *Encyclopedia of the Anthropocene (Second Edition)*, ed. by Michael I Goldstein, Scott A Elias, and Mark John Costello, Second Edition (London: Elsevier, 2026), pp. 369–80 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-443-14082-2.00068-5>

that the institution receiving their complaints lacks sufficient independence to examine them objectively or enforce corrective measures. This problem demonstrates that independence contains both structural and functional dimensions. Structural independence concerns the institutional position of the supervisory body and its separation from the units under supervision.⁴⁴

Functional independence concerns its practical ability to obtain information, examine investigators, reach conclusions, issue recommendations, and require corrective action without inappropriate interference. Strengthening only one dimension cannot guarantee effective supervision. Organizational separation without sufficient supervisory powers may produce a formally independent but operationally weak institution. Conversely, extensive supervisory powers without structural independence may leave decision making vulnerable to hierarchical influence.⁴⁵

Accountability provides another essential dimension of effective supervision. Public institutions must accept responsibility for their decisions and provide mechanisms through which affected individuals can challenge improper exercises of authority. Investigation supervision cannot achieve this objective when supervisory findings depend excessively on voluntary compliance by the units under examination. Recommendations that lack adequate institutional force may allow investigators or their superiors to implement findings selectively, delay corrective measures, or disregard them without meaningful consequences.⁴⁶ The effectiveness of supervision therefore depends on the relationship between supervisory findings and enforceable institutional responses. The available findings indicate that the problem extends beyond structural dependence. The supervisory system also faces limitations concerning the implementation of recommendations and the timeliness of complaint resolution. When supervisory recommendations do not create sufficiently clear obligations, their implementation depends heavily on the willingness of the investigative unit concerned. Similarly, differences between prescribed processing periods and actual complaint resolution may prolong uncertainty for complainants. These weaknesses directly affect legal certainty because complainants require not only access to a

⁴⁴ Geger Riyanto, 'Cultivating Extractive Bodies: Labor Frontiers and the Social Reproduction of Nickel Workers in North Maluku, Indonesia', *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 28 (2026), 101968 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2026.101968>

⁴⁵ Didiek Hardiyanto Soegiantoro and others, 'Public Perceptions of Community Pharmacists' Evolving Role in Health Promotion and Pharmaceutical Care: A Cross-Sectional Study in Indonesia', *Currents in Pharmacy Teaching and Learning*, 18.5 (2026), 102600 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cptl.2026.102600>

⁴⁶ Adam Miller and others, 'Evaluating the Impacts of Law Enforcement and Market Outreach Campaigns on the Indonesian Caged Bird Trade in Kalimantan', *Global Ecology and Conservation*, 67 (2026), e04193 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2026.e04193>

supervisory mechanism but also predictable procedures, timely decisions, transparent outcomes, and effective remedies.⁴⁷

Public reluctance to use formal complaint mechanisms provides a particularly important warning for institutional legitimacy. Interview evidence indicates that some complainants perceive little value in submitting complaints when the supervisory institution and the investigated units remain within the same organizational structure. Whether such perceptions accurately describe every supervisory process is less important than their institutional consequence.⁴⁸ A complaint mechanism cannot function effectively when potential complainants doubt its impartiality before initiating the process. Public confidence therefore constitutes a substantive component of effective supervision rather than merely a reputational concern. Civilian and external oversight can complement internal supervision by introducing additional accountability beyond the police hierarchy.⁴⁹ External scrutiny should not replace professional internal supervision because police organizations require specialized internal mechanisms capable of understanding investigative procedures and responding rapidly to operational problems. Instead, internal and external oversight should operate as complementary safeguards. Internal supervision can provide technical expertise and immediate institutional intervention, while external supervision can strengthen transparency, impartiality, and public legitimacy. A coherent relationship between these mechanisms can reduce institutional blind spots and provide stronger protection against conflicts of interest.⁵⁰

The findings identify three principal weaknesses in the existing system of investigation supervision. First, the institutional position of the Bureau within the Criminal Investigation Agency creates a structural conflict of interest that may restrict both actual and perceived independence. Second, the limited force of supervisory recommendations can weaken compliance and reduce the capacity of supervision to produce effective corrective outcomes.⁵¹ Third, differences between

⁴⁷ Pigo Nauli, Berly Napitupulu and Nasir Sultan, 'Collaborative Governance in Anti-Money Laundering: Inter-Agency Coordination and Money Laundering Control in Indonesia', *Journal of Economic Criminology*, 2026, 100242 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2026.100242>

⁴⁸ Mohamad Shohibuddin and others, 'The Politics of Invisibility: Everyday Extractive Violence and the Silencing of Agrarian Claims in the Bogor Bentonite Complex, Indonesia', *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 28 (2026), 102025 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2026.102025>

⁴⁹ Gregorius Agung Setyonugroho and others, 'Leveraging Past Recovery Strategy for Future Policy Implementation: Post-2018 Earthquake Residential Housing Reconstruction in Bayan Timur Hamlet, Lombok, Indonesia', *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 141 (2026), 106179 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2026.106179>

⁵⁰ Dwidjo Susilo and others, 'Can Indonesia Achieve Universal Health Coverage? Organisational and Financing Challenges in Implementing the National Health Insurance System', *SSM - Health Systems*, 5 (2025), 100138 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmhs.2025.100138>

⁵¹ Siti Rahmatia Ntou, 'Structural and Appraisal Analysis of a Phone Call between Two Indonesian Females: A Case Study', *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 14 (2026), 102871 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2026.102871>

formal standards for complaint resolution and actual implementation can prolong uncertainty and undermine public satisfaction with the complaint mechanism. These weaknesses demonstrate that the central problem does not arise from the absence of supervisory procedures. The existing system already provides mechanisms for receiving complaints, examining investigative conduct, issuing recommendations, and communicating complaint progress. The deeper challenge concerns whether the institutional architecture enables those mechanisms to operate independently and produce enforceable outcomes.⁵²

Reform should therefore move beyond procedural improvement toward institutional transformation. A stronger supervisory model requires sufficient structural autonomy, functional independence, enforceable authority, transparent decision making, measurable resolution periods, and effective coordination with external oversight institutions. Such reform would transform public complaint supervision from an internal administrative process into a substantive accountability mechanism capable of protecting legal certainty, strengthening professional investigation, and restoring public confidence in the criminal justice system.⁵³

The Effectiveness of Public Complaint Supervision and Its Institutional Limitations

Effective internal supervision within a law enforcement institution requires a clear institutional distinction between operational and supervisory functions. This separation protects impartiality, strengthens objective decision making, and prevents organizational interests from influencing the assessment of alleged misconduct. The principle of *nemo iudex in causa sua* embodies this requirement by rejecting arrangements in which an institution effectively assesses matters in which it possesses a direct organizational interest.⁵⁴ Applied to investigation supervision, this principle requires sufficient institutional distance between investigators and the officials responsible for evaluating their conduct. The current institutional structure of the Bureau for Investigation Supervision raises concerns in this respect. The Bureau forms part of the Criminal Investigation Agency and reports through the same organizational hierarchy that oversees the investigative units subject to supervision. Investigators and supervisors therefore operate within a shared institutional structure and ultimately remain connected to the

⁵² Luthfi Azizatunnisa' and others, "I Was given the Card, but No One Explained to Me How to Use It": Challenges and Facilitators of People with Disabilities in Indonesia in Accessing and Using Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (National Health Insurance)', *SSM - Health Systems*, 6 (2026), 100171 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmhs.2026.100171>

⁵³ Hendro Margono, Muhammad Saud and Asia Ashfaq, 'Dynamics of Hate Speech in Social Media: Insights from Indonesia', *Global Knowledge, Memory and Communication*, 75.5 (2026), 1784–1804 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/GKMC-11-2023-0464>

⁵⁴ Melike E Bildirici and Seyit M Gokmenoglu, 'Terrorism, Gold Production, and Economic Development: Evidence from Colombia, Dem. Rep. Congo, Indonesia, Mali and Philippines', *Resources Policy*, 116 (2026), 105909 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2026.105909>

same senior authority. This arrangement creates a structural conflict of interest because the supervisory body must assess investigative conduct while remaining organizationally dependent on the institution responsible for that conduct.⁵⁵

This structural relationship does not necessarily establish actual interference in every supervisory process. It nevertheless creates an institutional risk to both actual and perceived independence. Effective supervision requires more than professional integrity among individual supervisors. The institutional design itself must provide sufficient safeguards that enable supervisors to examine complaints, evaluate investigative decisions, and recommend corrective measures without organizational pressure.⁵⁶ The absence of adequate institutional distance may create reasonable doubts about whether supervision can consistently operate with the required degree of impartiality. The empirical findings reinforce this concern. An interviewed legal practitioner identified the subordinate position of the Bureau as a fundamental weakness in the existing supervisory structure. The interviewee's professional experience indicated that institutional proximity between supervisors and investigators can affect confidence in the capacity of supervision to produce meaningful corrective outcomes.⁵⁷ v

In one complaint concerning an alleged procedural violation during detention, the supervisory process resulted in a recommendation for internal guidance rather than a corrective response addressing the alleged procedural irregularity. Although a single experience cannot establish a general institutional pattern, it illustrates how complainants may perceive internal supervision as insufficient when supervisory findings do not generate tangible remedies. The findings also demonstrate that institutional independence involves more than formal organizational arrangements. Supervisory credibility depends on whether affected individuals perceive the process as impartial and capable of producing consequences.⁵⁸

A supervisory mechanism may comply with formal procedures but still experience a legitimacy deficit when complainants believe that organizational relationships influence its decisions. This distinction becomes particularly important for public complaints because citizens voluntarily rely on the

⁵⁵ Jayson S Lamchek, 'Takashi Shiraishi, The Phantom World of Digul: Policing as Politics in Colonial Indonesia, 1926–1941 (National University of Singapore Press: 2020)', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 52.1 (2024), 51 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajss.2024.03.003>

⁵⁶ Abdurrahman Abdurrahman, 'Social Media and Political Protest: Framing and Agenda-Setting in the Indonesian Demonstrations, August 2025', *Online Information Review*, 50.3 (2026), 1–23 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/OIR-10-2025-0809>

⁵⁷ Jonathan Davis Smith and others, 'When Energy Transitions Drive Polarization: Narratives of Green Energy and Mitigation Strategies by Proponents and Opponents of Geothermal Energy Developments in Indonesia', *Energy Policy*, 210 (2026), 115080 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115080>

⁵⁸ Natalia Widiastih Raharjanti and others, 'Mental Disorder in the Courtroom: Challenges for Legal Practice in Low-Resource Criminal Justice System: A Qualitative Analysis from Indonesia', *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 108 (2026), 102254 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2026.102254>

supervisory system to challenge alleged irregularities committed by investigators. Doubts concerning supervisory independence may therefore discourage the use of formal complaint mechanisms and weaken public confidence in institutional accountability.⁵⁹ The relationship between investigators and their supervisors also exposes an accountability problem. Effective accountability requires sufficient separation between the officials whose conduct requires examination and the institution responsible for assessing that conduct. Under the current structure, investigators perform operational functions while the Bureau evaluates their performance, yet both remain situated within the same organizational hierarchy. This arrangement can limit institutional distance and may weaken the capacity of supervision to challenge investigative practices when supervisory conclusions conflict with broader organizational interests.⁶⁰

A comparison with other supervisory arrangements provides additional insight into the significance of institutional separation. Independent oversight models generally distinguish the institution performing an operational function from the body responsible for evaluating professional conduct or institutional accountability. Such separation does not require complete organizational isolation. Rather, it requires sufficient structural and functional autonomy to ensure that supervisors can obtain information, conduct assessments, reach conclusions, and require corrective action without dependence on the operational unit under examination.⁶¹ The findings therefore identify institutional proximity as a central weakness in the existing model of investigation supervision. The problem does not arise merely because investigators and supervisors belong to the same broader police institution. The more significant concern lies in the hierarchical relationship that places the supervisory function within the organizational structure responsible for the investigative activities under review. This arrangement creates a risk that institutional loyalty, organizational hierarchy, or shared authority may influence supervisory decisions or create a public perception that such influence exists.⁶²

From the perspective of legal certainty, this structural weakness carries significant consequences. Public complaint supervision can provide meaningful

⁵⁹ Sandersan Onie and others, 'Indonesia's First Suicide Statistics Profile: An Analysis of Suicide and Attempt Rates, Underreporting, Geographic Distribution, Gender, Method, and Rurality', *The Lancet Regional Health - Southeast Asia*, 22 (2024), 100368 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lansea.2024.100368>

⁶⁰ Ratna Dwi Wulandari and others, 'Socioeconomic Disparities in Primary Healthcare Utilization in Eastern Indonesia', *Clinical Epidemiology and Global Health*, 35 (2025), 102154 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cegh.2025.102154>

⁶¹ Meity Ardiana and others, 'Higher Cardiovascular Risks and Atherogenic Index of Plasma Found in Police Officers of Developing Country in Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia', *Clinical Epidemiology and Global Health*, 17 (2022), 101132 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cegh.2022.101132>

⁶² Handar Subhandi Bakhtiar and others, 'The Role of Forensic Evidence in Indonesia's Criminal Justice', *Forensic Science International: Synergy*, 12 (2026), 100693 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsishyn.2026.100693>

legal protection only when complainants receive an impartial assessment, a clear decision, and an effective response to established investigative irregularities. Institutional arrangements that generate uncertainty about supervisory independence can weaken these guarantees even when formal complaint procedures function properly. The principle of *nemo iudex in causa sua* therefore provides more than an abstract standard of impartiality.⁶³

It offers a substantive basis for evaluating whether the institutional design of investigation supervision provides adequate protection against conflicts of interest. Strengthening investigation supervision requires greater structural and functional separation between operational investigation and supervisory authority. Reform should provide the supervisory institution with sufficient autonomy to examine investigators, assess complaints, determine supervisory findings, and require corrective measures without dependence on the operational hierarchy under examination. Such institutional separation would reduce structural conflicts of interest, strengthen impartiality, improve the credibility of public complaint resolution, and provide a stronger foundation for legal certainty.⁶⁴

The command hierarchy supports discipline, coordination, and operational responsibility within the Indonesian National Police. However, the findings demonstrate that hierarchical dependence can restrict objective investigation supervision when supervisors and investigators operate within the same chain of command. Supervisors may encounter institutional and psychological pressure when examining investigators of equivalent rank or personnel who maintain professional relationships with senior officials. Interview findings illustrate this concern. A retired senior police officer identified hierarchical pressure as a practical obstacle to impartial supervision and described a case in which indications of misconduct resulted in the transfer of an investigator rather than stronger disciplinary action.⁶⁵ This experience suggests that organizational relationships may influence the implementation of supervisory findings. The limited authority of supervisory recommendations creates an additional challenge. The Bureau can identify investigative deficiencies and recommend corrective measures, but other institutional mechanisms determine disciplinary consequences. This separation may weaken accountability when investigative units do not fully implement supervisory recommendations. Organizational

⁶³ Saesario Putra, Ruth M Morgan and Sherry Nakhaeizadeh, 'An Evaluation of the ACE-V Latent Fingerprint Examination Process in the Indonesian National Police', *Science & Justice*, 65.5 (2025), 101316 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2025.101316>

⁶⁴ Andi Arafat and others, 'Transforming Indigenous Ownership Claims into State-Regulated Access in a National Park in Indonesia: A Power Relation Perspective', *Trees, Forests and People*, 26 (2026), 101398 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tfp.2026.101398>

⁶⁵ Sajida Sajida, 'The Expansion of Military Influence in Indonesia's Governance: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse Analysis of Media Narratives', *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 13 (2026), 102428 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2025.102428>

culture can intensify this limitation when professional solidarity discourages personnel from reporting or acting firmly against colleagues.⁶⁶

Complaint data further demonstrate the gap between supervisory demand and substantive intervention. The Bureau conducted 1,657 supervisory activities against 3,488 substantive complaints in 2023, 1,682 activities against 3,782 complaints in 2024, and 1,883 activities against 3,770 complaints in 2025. These activities represented approximately 47.5 percent, 44.5 percent, and 49.9 percent of substantive complaints respectively, although individual complaints may involve different forms of supervisory intervention. These findings show that supervisory effectiveness depends on more than formal procedures or the volume of supervisory activities. Legal certainty requires impartial decisions, effective implementation, and meaningful corrective consequences. Greater functional autonomy, stronger implementation authority, and a professional culture that prioritizes accountability would enable supervisors to examine investigative conduct more objectively. Institutional separation between operational command and supervision could therefore strengthen independence, improve accountability, and provide greater legal certainty in criminal investigations.

The institutional transformation of the Bureau for Investigation Supervision forms part of Indonesia's broader agenda for bureaucratic reform and improved public governance. The national bureaucratic reform framework identifies stronger internal supervision as a central area of institutional change. This policy direction requires public institutions, including the Indonesian National Police, to develop supervisory mechanisms that exercise control effectively, independently, and accountably. Internal supervision therefore extends beyond administrative compliance.⁶⁷ It constitutes an institutional mechanism for preventing abuse of authority, strengthening accountability, and supporting clean and responsible governance. Effective internal control requires institutions to ensure that officials perform their duties consistently with legal requirements, operational standards, and principles of accountable governance. An effective supervisory system must identify potential irregularities, respond to violations, evaluate institutional performance, and ensure that officials remain accountable for the exercise of public authority. Within this framework, institutional design directly influences the effectiveness of supervision because formal supervisory powers cannot

⁶⁶ Sulih Indra Dewi and others, 'Voicing the Body: Postcolonial Feminist Praxis and Narratives of Body Autonomy in Indonesian Women's Podcasts', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 117 (2026), 103331 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2026.103331>

⁶⁷ Maminirina Fenitra Rakotoarisoa, Heni Kurniasih and Mikea Manitra Ramalina Ranaivo, 'Advancing Regional Cooperation to Combat Marine Debris and Enhance Livelihoods in Indonesia: Translating Global Agendas into Local Action', *Marine Pollution Bulletin*, 224 (2026), 119097 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2025.119097>

produce meaningful accountability when organizational arrangements restrict independent decision making.⁶⁸

This requirement has particular significance for the Indonesian National Police because criminal investigations involve extensive public authority and directly affect individual rights and legal certainty. The existing legal framework requires the police to perform their functions professionally, transparently, and accountably. However, normative standards alone cannot guarantee these objectives. The institution must provide supervisory bodies with sufficient authority and organizational autonomy to examine investigative conduct and ensure corrective action. Interview findings support this institutional direction.⁶⁹ A government official involved in political, legal, and security affairs considered the establishment of an autonomous investigation supervision division consistent with the broader policy of strengthening internal control within police reform. Institutional reform should consequently address the relationship between operational investigation and supervisory authority. A supervisory body that remains closely integrated into the operational hierarchy may encounter difficulties when reviewing decisions made within that same hierarchy. Greater functional autonomy would create institutional distance between investigation and supervision while maintaining coordination within the police organization. This arrangement could strengthen impartial decision making and provide clearer accountability for supervisory outcomes.⁷⁰

The reform should also develop a hybrid model of supervision that combines independent examination with internal enforcement. Under this model, a supervisory body with sufficient institutional autonomy would examine complaints, identify investigative irregularities, and determine necessary corrective measures, while the competent internal institution would implement disciplinary or remedial consequences. Such an arrangement would preserve organizational responsibility while reducing the risk that operational interests influence supervisory assessment. The transformation of the Bureau should not merely change its organizational title or administrative position. Reform must strengthen its independence, authority, accountability, and capacity to ensure implementation of supervisory findings. This approach would align bureaucratic reform with the practical demands of investigation supervision and provide

⁶⁸ Wahyu Fadli Satrya, Ria Aprilliyani and Emny Harna Yossy, 'Sentiment Analysis of Indonesian Police Chief Using Multi-Level Ensemble Model', *Procedia Computer Science*, 216 (2023), 620–29 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2022.12.177>

⁶⁹ Eriyanto, 'Do Reporting Guidelines Improve the Quality of Suicide Coverage?: A Case Study of Indonesia', *Mental Health & Prevention*, 40 (2025), 200463 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mhp.2025.200463>

⁷⁰ Saesario Putra, Ruth M Morgan and Sherry Nakhaeizadeh, 'The Impact of Fingermark Analysis Guidelines and Fingerprint Quality Assessment Software on the Evaluation of Fingermark Value within the Indonesian National Police', *Science & Justice*, 66.3 (2026), 101433 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2026.101433>

stronger institutional foundations for transparent, accountable, and legally certain criminal investigations.⁷¹

Indonesia's institutional experience also demonstrates the significance of structural independence. Several oversight institutions operate separately from the bodies whose conduct they assess. This model reflects a broader institutional principle that effective accountability requires sufficient distance between the exercise of authority and the evaluation of that authority. Applied to criminal investigation supervision, this principle suggests that organizational proximity between investigators and supervisors may weaken both actual independence and public perceptions of impartiality. However, external supervision alone cannot resolve weaknesses in investigation accountability. The National Police Commission illustrates this limitation because its supervisory role primarily depends on monitoring, assessment, and recommendations rather than direct authority to enforce corrective measures. A supervisory institution may therefore possess structural independence while lacking sufficient functional authority to ensure implementation. Conversely, an internal body may possess technical expertise and institutional access but remain constrained by organizational hierarchy. Neither model independently provides a complete solution.⁷²

These comparative findings support a hybrid supervisory model that combines institutional independence with effective internal enforcement capacity. Under this approach, an autonomous investigation supervision body would examine complaints, assess investigative conduct, determine supervisory findings, and require corrective responses without dependence on the operational units under examination. Internal disciplinary institutions would retain responsibility for imposing appropriate professional consequences, while external oversight bodies would provide additional scrutiny and public accountability. The significance of this model lies in balancing independence with enforceability. Institutional reform should therefore avoid merely relocating the supervisory body within the organizational structure. It should establish clear supervisory authority, transparent procedures, effective coordination, measurable resolution standards, and mechanisms that ensure compliance with supervisory decisions. The empirical persistence of substantive complaints and the comparative institutional experience together demonstrate that effective investigation supervision requires both structural independence and functional authority. These two elements provide the institutional foundation for transforming public complaints from an

⁷¹ Mustaffa Abdullah and others, 'An Outlook for the Emergence of Radicalism in Indonesia and Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis', *Safer Communities*, 24.4 (2025), 356–76 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/SC-09-2024-0056>

⁷² William Maxey and others, 'Discrepancy between Policy and Practice: A Case Study on Hegemony within an Indonesian Juvenile Correctional Center (LPKA)', *Children and Youth Services Review*, 177 (2025), 108469 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2025.108469>

administrative reporting mechanism into an effective instrument of accountability and legal certainty.⁷³

Transforming Investigation Supervision into an Independent Institutional

The transformation of the Bureau for Investigation Supervision into an independent Investigation Supervision Division requires substantive institutional reconstruction rather than a simple administrative adjustment. The proposed model responds to the structural tension between investigative authority and supervisory independence within the police organization. Effective supervision requires sufficient structural and functional autonomy to enable supervisors to examine investigative conduct objectively and require appropriate corrective measures. When supervisors remain subordinate to the operational structure they examine, hierarchical relationships may restrict impartial decision making and weaken institutional accountability.⁷⁴

Good governance provides an important foundation for this reconstruction because public institutions must exercise authority transparently, responsibly, and under effective supervision. This principle carries particular importance in criminal investigations because investigators exercise powers that directly affect individual rights and legal certainty. Investigation supervision must therefore move beyond administrative verification and ensure that supervisory processes identify irregularities, resolve public complaints, correct improper investigative practices, and prevent repeated violations.⁷⁵

The proposed institutional design separates supervisory authority from operational investigation while retaining both functions within the police organization. An independent Investigation Supervision Division should report directly to the Chief of the Indonesian National Police rather than remain subordinate to the Criminal Investigation Agency. This arrangement would establish institutional distance, reduce hierarchical dependence, and prevent operational authorities from exercising influence over supervisory assessments. The findings also demonstrate that institutional independence must strengthen public confidence. Citizens may question supervisory credibility when investigators and supervisors operate within the same command structure.

⁷³ Vincent Nijman and others, 'Quantifying Illegal Rosewood Trade, Seizures and Forestry Law Enforcement in Indonesia', *Applied Geography*, 176 (2025), 103509 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2025.103509>

⁷⁴ Paul Vinod Khiatani, Wing Hong Chui and Dagim Dawit Gonsamo, 'Advancing Child Protection Systems in Indonesia and Ethiopia: A Comparative Analysis of Progress and Challenges', *Child Abuse & Neglect*, 170 (2025), 107762 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2025.107762>

⁷⁵ Pisca A Tias, Constance L McDermott and Mari E Mulyani, 'Navigating the Nexus between Customary Norms and State Laws in Shaping Rural Forest Governance: A Case Study in Aceh Province, Indonesia', *Forest Policy and Economics*, 182 (2026), 103672 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2025.103672>

Independence must therefore exist both institutionally and practically through impartial decisions, transparent procedures, and effective implementation.⁷⁶

The proposed model should consequently evaluate supervisory performance through substantive outcomes rather than administrative outputs. Assessment should consider complaint resolution, correction of investigative irregularities, implementation of supervisory decisions, prevention of repeated misconduct, and improvement of legal certainty. An independent Investigation Supervision Division with clear authority, direct accountability, and effective corrective powers would reduce structural conflicts of interest and provide a stronger institutional foundation for responsive, ethical, fair, and accountable criminal investigation supervision.⁷⁷

Based on the theoretical framework developed above, this study proposes a multilevel institutional model for investigation supervision that operates across the organizational levels of the Indonesian National Police. The model addresses the limitations of centralized supervision by establishing supervisory capacity closer to the regional institutions where most criminal investigations take place. It creates an integrated supervisory structure at national, regional, and district levels while separating supervisory authority from operational investigation. At the national level, an Investigation Supervision Division should operate under the direct authority of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police. An Inspector General should lead the Division, placing its institutional status alongside other major supervisory functions within police headquarters. This position would strengthen its authority to supervise investigative directorates and reduce the hierarchical imbalance that currently limits supervisory independence. The Division should contain specialized units responsible for investigation control, public complaint management, preliminary examination, information technology, planning, and performance reporting. Functional specialization would enable each unit to develop appropriate expertise while maintaining unified supervisory accountability.⁷⁸

At the regional level, each Regional Police institution should establish an Investigation Supervision Department. This unit should remain functionally accountable to the Investigation Supervision Division at national headquarters while maintaining administrative coordination with the Regional Police Chief. Such dual accountability would preserve regional administrative integration

⁷⁶ Jon S T Quah, 'Combating Police Corruption in Indonesia: Cleansing the Buaya (Crocodile)', *Asian Education and Development Studies*, 9.2 (2020), 129–43 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-04-2018-0088>

⁷⁷ Agussabti Agussabti and others, 'Institutional Framework for Improving Food Security in Crisis-Prone Areas in Indonesia', *Journal of Agriculture and Food Research*, 2026, 102774 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jafr.2026.102774>

⁷⁸ Irfan Saputra and others, 'Sequencing the Political Forest: Power, Exclusion, and the Corporate Hijacking of Social Forestry in Indonesia', *Forest Policy and Economics*, 181 (2025), 103668 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2025.103668>

without placing supervisors under the operational authority of regional criminal investigation directors. Institutional capacity should also reflect regional workloads because complaint volumes differ considerably among jurisdictions. At the district level, this study proposes an Investigation Supervision Section that reports functionally to the regional supervisory department. This structure would bring substantive supervision closer to investigators and complainants while reducing dependence on units primarily responsible for professional discipline. Implementation could proceed gradually, beginning with metropolitan and urban police jurisdictions that manage larger investigative workloads and possess greater personnel capacity.⁷⁹

This multilevel structure creates an integrated control system with a distinct vertical supervisory chain. National headquarters would establish standards and strategic direction, regional units would coordinate and supervise implementation, and district units would conduct direct monitoring of investigative practices. The principal innovation lies not merely in extending supervision across organizational levels, but in separating the supervisory chain from operational investigation. This model would strengthen institutional independence, improve accessibility for complainants, accelerate supervisory responses, and establish more consistent accountability from national headquarters to district police institutions.⁸⁰

The proposed transformation of the Bureau for Investigation Supervision into an independent Investigation Supervision Division requires a clear allocation of authority among existing police oversight institutions. Without precise institutional boundaries, reform could create overlapping mandates and jurisdictional conflicts. The proposed model therefore distinguishes supervision according to its object and purpose. The Investigation Supervision Division should focus on the legality, procedure, and quality of criminal investigations. The Professional and Security Division should address personnel conduct, professional ethics, and discipline, while the National Police Commission should exercise external oversight over broader institutional performance and accountability.⁸¹ In relation to the Criminal Investigation Agency, the proposed Division should apply the principle of oversight without interference. Supervisors should not determine suspects, direct evidentiary conclusions, or replace investigators in making lawful investigative decisions. Instead, they should assess whether investigators comply

⁷⁹ Roni Zakaria Raung and others, 'Scenario Analysis of Subsidy Policies on Electric Motorcycle Market in Indonesia Using System Dynamics Simulation', *Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, 32 (2025), 101487 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trip.2025.101487>

⁸⁰ Idhamsyah Eka Putra and others, "'I Am Indonesian, Am I?': Papuans' Psychological and Identity Dynamics about Indonesia", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 99 (2024), 101935 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2024.101935>

⁸¹ Massimiliano Cali and others, 'Trade Policy and Exporters' Resilience: Evidence from Indonesia', *Journal of Development Economics*, 179 (2026), 103561 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103561>

with criminal procedure, obtain evidence lawfully, protect individual rights, avoid abuse of authority, and provide reasonable certainty regarding case progression. This arrangement preserves professional investigative discretion while subjecting the exercise of that discretion to independent procedural accountability.⁸²

The relationship with the General Supervision Inspectorate should operate through functional complementarity. The Inspectorate should retain responsibility for general organizational supervision, including administration, finance, human resources, logistics, and institutional performance. The Investigation Supervision Division should exercise specialized control over criminal investigation processes. Both institutions should implement a cross-referral mechanism when findings extend beyond their respective mandates.⁸³ A similar division should govern relations with the Professional and Security Division. The Investigation Supervision Division should assess investigative processes and quality, while the Professional and Security Division should determine disciplinary and ethical responsibility. When investigation supervision identifies potential professional misconduct, the Division should refer the findings through a standardized protocol that establishes clear response periods and requires feedback concerning subsequent disciplinary action.⁸⁴

The National Police Commission should complement this internal architecture through external evaluation. The Investigation Supervision Division would function as the primary internal mechanism for resolving investigation related complaints, while the Commission would assess the effectiveness, independence, and accountability of that supervisory process. This model establishes complementary oversight rather than institutional competition. Clear mandates, mandatory referrals, information exchange, response deadlines, and reporting obligations would connect different supervisory institutions without merging their functions. Such an arrangement would prevent both overlapping authority and supervisory gaps, creating an integrated accountability system in which investigation quality, professional conduct, organizational governance, and external scrutiny reinforce one another.⁸⁵

⁸² Dzuriyatun Toyibah and Irma Riyani, 'Contesting Religious Authority in Response to Government Regulations on the Prevention and Handling of Campus Sexual Violence (CSV) in Indonesia', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 110 (2025), 103085 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2025.103085>

⁸³ Wildan Sena Utama, 'Politics and Governance in Indonesia. The Police in the Era of Reformasi, Written by Muradi', *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia*, 171.4 (2015), 593–95 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17104017>

⁸⁴ Aga Natalis, Adventi Ferawati Sembiring and Emy Handayani, 'From Rejection to Recognition: Human Rights, Morality, and the Future of Marijuana Policy in Indonesia', *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 140 (2025), 104817 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2025.104817>

⁸⁵ Martitah Martitah and others, 'Insufficient Criminal Justice System Response to the Severity of Domestic Violence during the Pandemic in Indonesia', *Heliyon*, 10.14 (2024), e33719 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e33719>

Conclusion

This study finds that the existing framework for supervising criminal investigations has not adequately ensured independent, effective, and accountable resolution of public complaints. The Bureau for Investigation Supervision conducts assistance, supervision, and special case reviews, but its position within the Criminal Investigation Agency restricts its institutional autonomy and creates structural tension between investigative and supervisory functions. The empirical findings confirm this weakness. The Bureau recorded 3,488 substantive complaints in 2023, 3,782 in 2024, and 3,770 in 2025, while substantive supervisory activities accounted for approximately 47.5 percent, 44.5 percent, and 49.9 percent respectively. These figures indicate a continuing gap between the demand for investigation supervision and the capacity to deliver substantive supervisory responses. Moreover, nonbinding recommendations weaken the ability of supervisors to secure corrective action and provide legal certainty for complainants.

The findings establish that procedural improvement alone cannot address these institutional weaknesses. Persistent public complaints, recurring disciplinary and ethical violations, limited enforcement of supervisory findings, and hierarchical dependence require a more fundamental institutional reform. Effective supervision requires both independence from operational investigative structures and sufficient authority to ensure compliance with supervisory decisions. This study therefore proposes transforming the Bureau into an independent Investigation Supervision Division that reports directly to the Chief of the Indonesian National Police. The proposed model establishes an integrated supervisory structure at national, regional, and district levels. It combines responsive supervision through early detection and digital complaint management, ethical supervision through integrity-based personnel governance, and fair supervision through procedural safeguards, accessible complaint mechanisms, and enforceable corrective measures. The police should implement this transformation progressively through institutional capacity development, regulatory restructuring, regional pilot programs, nationwide expansion, and organizational cultural reform. This model ultimately reorients public complaint supervision from administrative compliance toward substantive accountability. By strengthening institutional independence and ensuring meaningful implementation of supervisory findings, the proposed framework can improve investigative integrity, provide greater legal certainty, and strengthen public confidence in the criminal justice system.

References

- Abdullah, Mustaffa, Shuaibu Umar Gokaru, Abdul Karim bin Ali, Wan Adli Wan Ramli, Dodi Irawan and Youcef Bensala, 'An Outlook for the Emergence of Radicalism in Indonesia and Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis', *Safer Communities*, 24 (2025), 356–76

<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/SC-09-2024-0056>

- Abdurrahman, Abdurrahman, 'Social Media and Political Protest: Framing and Agenda-Setting in the Indonesian Demonstrations, August 2025', *Online Information Review*, 50 (2026), 1–23 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/OIR-10-2025-0809>
- Adhikara, Rio and Panji Yugo Putranto, 'Revisiting Police Legitimacy: Exploring Determinants beyond Performance, Procedural Justice, Public Satisfaction, and Its Practices', *Policing and Society*, 36 (2026), 494 – 510 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2025.2579623>
- Agussabti, Agussabti, Agus Nugroho, Adhyta Puspita Summase, Rasdiana Mudatsir and Idris Summase, 'Institutional Framework for Improving Food Security in Crisis-Prone Areas in Indonesia', *Journal of Agriculture and Food Research*, 2026, 102774 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jafr.2026.102774>
- Amostian, Yusriyadi and Ana Silviana, 'Reformasi Polri Melalui Penguatan Fungsi Dan Kewenangan Komisi Kepolisian Nasional Dalam Melakukan Pengawasan Eksternal Terhadap Polri', *Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia*, 5 (2023), 510 – 522 <https://doi.org/10.14710/jphi.v5i3.510-522>
- Arafat, Andi, Senawi Senawi, Muhammad Alif K Sahide and Ahmad Maryudi, 'Transforming Indigenous Ownership Claims into State-Regulated Access in a National Park in Indonesia: A Power Relation Perspective', *Trees, Forests and People*, 26 (2026), 101398 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tfp.2026.101398>
- Ardiana, Meity, Primasitha Maharany Harsoyo, Hanestya Oky Hermawan, Inna Maya Sufiyah, Dwika Rasyid Firmanda, Saskia Ratna Desita, and others, 'Higher Cardiovascular Risks and Atherogenic Index of Plasma Found in Police Officers of Developing Country in Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia', *Clinical Epidemiology and Global Health*, 17 (2022), 101132 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cegh.2022.101132>
- Arnapi, Karnaji, Izzah Khalif Raihan Abidin and Rofadan Mina Arsyada, 'Paradigma Hukum Kedudukan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia Dalam Pengamanan Aksi Unjuk Rasa', *Media Iuris*, 7 (2024), 31 – 50 <https://doi.org/10.20473/mi.v7i1.43709>
- Assalamah, Tuhfatul Mubarakah, Rahma Sugihartati, Muhammad Saud and Agus Danugroho, 'Hijab as Credibility Work and the Actionability of Digital Traces among Queer Muslim Women in Indonesia', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 119 (2026), 103384 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2026.103384>
- Azizatunnisa', Luthfi, Hannah Kuper, Ari Probandari and Lena Morgon Banks, '"I Was given the Card, but No One Explained to Me How to Use It": Challenges and Facilitators of People with Disabilities in Indonesia in Accessing and Using Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (National Health Insurance)', *SSM - Health Systems*, 6 (2026), 100171 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmhs.2026.100171>
- Baker, Jacqui, *THE INDONESIAN POLICE*, Routledge Handbook of Indonesian Law, 2026 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032709840-5>

- Bakhtiar, Handar Subhandi, Amir Ilyas, Abdul Kholiq, Handina Sulastrina Bakhtiar and Ahmad Yusup, 'The Role of Forensic Evidence in Indonesia's Criminal Justice', *Forensic Science International: Synergy*, 12 (2026), 100693
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsisyn.2026.100693>
- Bildirici, Melike E and Seyit M Gokmenoglu, 'Terrorism, Gold Production, and Economic Development: Evidence from Colombia, Dem. Rep. Congo, Indonesia, Mali and Philippines', *Resources Policy*, 116 (2026), 105909
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2026.105909>
- Budiyono, 'Counterterrorism in Indonesia: The Police Role in Ensuring Security', *Pakistan Journal of Criminology*, 16 (2024), 733 – 741 <https://doi.org/10.62271/pjc.16.2.733.741>
- Calì, Massimiliano, Simón Caicedo Graciano, Devaki Ghose, Angella Faith Montfaucon and Michele Ruta, 'Trade Policy and Exporters' Resilience: Evidence from Indonesia', *Journal of Development Economics*, 179 (2026), 103561
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103561>
- Dewi, Sulih Indra, Myrtati Dyah Artaria, Irfan Wahyudi and Aneta Ostaszewska, 'Voicing the Body: Postcolonial Feminist Praxis and Narratives of Body Autonomy in Indonesian Women's Podcasts', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 117 (2026), 103331
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2026.103331>
- Durahman, Dani, Edi Setiadi and Rusli Iskandar, 'Efforts to Build the Integrity of Investigators to Realize Just Law Enforcement', *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues*, 24 (2021), 1 – 7 <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85112857480&partnerID=40&md5=0b07b64db4c9ed22cacc6e4d83f68825>
- Eriyanto, 'Do Reporting Guidelines Improve the Quality of Suicide Coverage?: A Case Study of Indonesia', *Mental Health & Prevention*, 40 (2025), 200463
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mhp.2025.200463>
- Firdaus, Muhammad, Chryshnanda Dwilaksana and Muhammad Daffa Auliarizky Onielda, 'Shifting Polri's Law Enforcement Strategy: Restorative Justice for Public Trust', *Jurnal Media Hukum*, 30 (2023), 153 – 170
<https://doi.org/10.18196/jmh.v30i2.18628>
- Haviluddin, Muhammad Iqbal, Gubtha Mahendra Putra, Novianti Puspitasari, Hario Jati Setyadi, Felix Andika Dwiyanto, and others, 'A Performance Comparison of Euclidean, Manhattan and Minkowski Distances in K-Means Clustering', in *2020 6th International Conference on Science in Information Technology: Embracing Industry 4.0: Towards Innovation in Disaster Management, ICSITech 2020*, 2020, pp. 184 – 188
<https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSITech49800.2020.9392053>
- Huang, Yu-Lin and Shih-Hung Chang, 'Design Professionals' Legal Risks Increased under Nature's Attack: Chichi Earthquake Experience', *International Journal of Project Management*, 27 (2009), 544–51 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.10.008>
- Hulwanullah, Hikam and Torik Abdul Aziz Wibowo, 'Hybrid Multi-Level Constitutional

- Complaint: Reforming Constitutional Rights Protection in Indonesia', *Constitutional Review*, 12 (2026), 264 – 312 <https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev1218>
- Hutahaean, Armunanto and Erlyn Indarti, 'Implementation of Investigation by the Indonesian National Police in Eradicating Corruption Crime', *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, 23 (2020), 136–54 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-12-2018-0075>
- Irawan, Aris, Dewi Nurvianti, Rakotoarisoa Maminirina Fenitra and Mohammed Alhadi Ibrahim Bosha Ahmed, 'The Role of Institutionalization Police Support in Emergency Situation: Evidence from Indonesia', *Journal of Human Rights, Culture and Legal System*, 3 (2023), 109 – 133 <https://doi.org/10.53955/jhcls.v3i1.80>
- Jackson, Jonathan, Ben Bradford, Mike Hough, Andy Myhill, Paul Quinton and Tom R Tyler, 'Why Do People Comply with the Law?', *British Journal of Criminology*, 52 (2012), 1051 – 1071 <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azs032>
- Jumadi, Dea Justicia Ardha, Abdul Jafar and Muhammad Adi Saputra, 'Police Legal Responsibility For Crime and Theft Involving Violence', *Nurani*, 23 (2023), 141 – 152 <https://doi.org/10.19109/nurani.v23i1.14177>
- Kadir, Abdul, Muh Amir, Jamaluddin Hos, Muh Jufri Dewa and Eka Suaib, 'Misaligned Governance in Indonesia's Nickel Boom: Design and Capacity Failures in the Mandiodo Block', *Resources Policy*, 120 (2026), 106018 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2026.106018>
- Khiatani, Paul Vinod, Wing Hong Chui and Dagim Dawit Gonsamo, 'Advancing Child Protection Systems in Indonesia and Ethiopia: A Comparative Analysis of Progress and Challenges', *Child Abuse & Neglect*, 170 (2025), 107762 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2025.107762>
- Lamchek, Jayson S, 'Takashi Shiraishi, The Phantom World of Digul: Policing as Politics in Colonial Indonesia, 1926–1941 (National University of Singapore Press: 2020)', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 52 (2024), 51 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajss.2024.03.003>
- Lasmadi, Sahuri, 'Issuance of a Search Warrant for Narcotics Crime in Indonesia', *Law Reform: Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum*, 16 (2020), 45 – 57 <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v16i1.30304>
- Margono, Hendro, Muhammad Saud and Asia Ashfaq, 'Dynamics of Hate Speech in Social Media: Insights from Indonesia', *Global Knowledge, Memory and Communication*, 75 (2026), 1784–1804 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/GKMC-11-2023-0464>
- Martitah, Martitah, Dewi Sulistianingsih, Rahmawati Mohd Yusoff and Noraini Ismail, 'Insufficient Criminal Justice System Response to the Severity of Domestic Violence during the Pandemic in Indonesia', *Heliyon*, 10 (2024), e33719 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e33719>

- Masciandaro, Donato and Marc Quintyn, 'Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand?', *The North American Journal of Economics and Finance*, 19 (2008), 153–73
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2008.02.002>
- Maulidin, Iskandar A Gani and Efendi, 'PENERAPAN ASAS-ASAS UMUM PEMERINTAHAN YANG BAIK DALAM PEMBERHENTIAN TIDAK DENGAN HORMAT TERHADAP ANGGOTA POLRI', *Jurnal Suara Hukum*, 5 (2023), 68 – 88
<https://doi.org/10.26740/jsh.v5n1.p68.20-2088>
- Maxey, William, Zainal Arifin, Hari Harjanto Setiawan, Sri Setiawati and Rudi Febriamansyah, 'Discrepancy between Policy and Practice: A Case Study on Hegemony within an Indonesian Juvenile Correctional Center (LPKA)', *Children and Youth Services Review*, 177 (2025), 108469
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2025.108469>
- Mayes, David G, 'Who Pays for Bank Insolvency in Transition and Emerging Economies?', *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 29 (2005), 161–81
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.020>
- Miller, Adam, Abrar Ahmad, Agung Nur Haq, Hardini Indart, Iwan Setiabudi, Awit Mulyawarman, and others, 'Evaluating the Impacts of Law Enforcement and Market Outreach Campaigns on the Indonesian Caged Bird Trade in Kalimantan', *Global Ecology and Conservation*, 67 (2026), e04193
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2026.e04193>
- Natalis, Aga, Adventi Ferawati Sembiring and Emy Handayani, 'From Rejection to Recognition: Human Rights, Morality, and the Future of Marijuana Policy in Indonesia', *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 140 (2025), 104817
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2025.104817>
- Nauli, Pigo, Berly Napitupulu and Nasir Sultan, 'Collaborative Governance in Anti-Money Laundering: Inter-Agency Coordination and Money Laundering Control in Indonesia', *Journal of Economic Criminology*, 2026, 100242
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2026.100242>
- Nijman, Vincent, Jessica Chavez, Devon Simons, Penthai Siritwat, Ratna Ayu Widiawari and Magdalena S Svensson, 'Quantifying Illegal Rosewood Trade, Seizures and Forestry Law Enforcement in Indonesia', *Applied Geography*, 176 (2025), 103509
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2025.103509>
- Ntou, Siti Rahmatia, 'Structural and Appraisal Analysis of a Phone Call between Two Indonesian Females: A Case Study', *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 14 (2026), 102871
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2026.102871>
- Nurwulantari, Yunita and Anna Erliyana, 'Considering the Model of Review of Public Official Decisions by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia (Comparative Study of Indonesia and South Korea); [Menimbang Model Pengujian Keputusan Pejabat Publik Oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik I', *Jurnal Konstitusi*, 18

(2021), 168 – 194 <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1818>

Nuryanto, Ahmad Dwi, Adi Sulistiyono and Pujiono, 'Problem Investigation of Criminal Washing That Came from the Predicate Crime Banking by the Investigator', *International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology*, 29 (2020), 1543 – 1549 <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85083047510&partnerID=40&md5=5280944aa993d563067d9b2f77429c68>

Onie, Sandersan, Yuslely Usman, Retno Widyastuti, Merry Lusiana, Tri Juni

Angkasawati, Dede Anwar Musadad, and others, 'Indonesia's First Suicide Statistics Profile: An Analysis of Suicide and Attempt Rates, Underreporting, Geographic Distribution, Gender, Method, and Rurality', *The Lancet Regional Health - Southeast Asia*, 22 (2024), 100368 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lansea.2024.100368>

Paoline, Eugene A, Stephanie M Myers and Robert E Worden, 'Police Culture, Individualism, and Community Policing: Evidence from Two Police Departments', *Justice Quarterly*, 17 (2000), 576 – 605 <https://doi.org/10.1080/07418820000094671>

Phayal, Anup, Brandon Prins, Seyma Tufan, Sayed Fauzan Riyadi and Curie Maharani, 'Caught in the Net: Unraveling the Piracy-IUU Fishing Milieu in Indonesian Waters through Survey Data', *Political Geography*, 125 (2026), 103449 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2025.103449>

Purbiyantari, Wahyu, Soesilo Zauhar, Suryadi, Romy Hermawan and Bambang Slamet Riyadi, 'Leadership and Service in the Police Context_A Qualitative Study', *International Journal of Membrane Science and Technology*, 10 (2023), 846 – 856 <https://doi.org/10.15379/ijmst.v10i2.1390>

Putra, Idhamsyah Eka, Vici Sofianna Putera, Elvira Rumkabu, Risma Jayanti, Achmad Robbi Fathoni and Dominica Junita Caroline, "'I Am Indonesian, Am I?": Papuans' Psychological and Identity Dynamics about Indonesia', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 99 (2024), 101935 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2024.101935>

Putra, Saesario, Ruth M Morgan and Sherry Nakhaeizadeh, 'An Evaluation of the ACE-V Latent Fingerprint Examination Process in the Indonesian National Police', *Science & Justice*, 65 (2025), 101316 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2025.101316>

— — —, 'The Impact of Fingerprint Analysis Guidelines and Fingerprint Quality Assessment Software on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Value within the Indonesian National Police', *Science & Justice*, 66 (2026), 101433 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2026.101433>

Putri, Ade Suzana Eka, Taufika Ophiyandri, Benny Hidayat, Bambang Istijono, Dilanthi Amaratunga, Richard Haigh, and others, 'Gaps in Integrating Public Health into Local Disaster Risk Reduction: Evidence from Indonesia's Pandemic Response in Padang City', *Progress in Disaster Science*, 31 (2026), 100667 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2026.100667>

- Putri, Adelia Khrisna, Arka Nareswari, Gregory Armstrong, Diana Setiyawati and Karl Andriessen, 'Supporting Healing after Suicide Loss: Development and Validation of the First Co-Designed Resource Booklet for Indonesian Suicide Loss Survivors', *Mental Health & Prevention*, 42 (2026), 200499 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mhp.2026.200499>
- Quah, Jon ST, 'Combating Police Corruption in Indonesia: Cleansing the Buaya (Crocodile)', *Asian Education and Development Studies*, 9 (2020), 129-43 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-04-2018-0088>
- Raharjanti, Natalia Widiasih, Adhitya Sigit Ramadianto, Ronald Leonardo, Aisha Emilirosy Roekman, Claudia Gunawan, Rizky Farandi Mubasir, and others, 'Mental Disorder in the Courtroom: Challenges for Legal Practice in Low-Resource Criminal Justice System: A Qualitative Analysis from Indonesia', *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 108 (2026), 102254 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2026.102254>
- Rakotoarisoa, Maminirina Fenitra, Heni Kurniasih and Mikea Manitra Ramalina Ranaivo, 'Advancing Regional Cooperation to Combat Marine Debris and Enhance Livelihoods in Indonesia: Translating Global Agendas into Local Action', *Marine Pollution Bulletin*, 224 (2026), 119097 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2025.119097>
- Raung, Roni Zakaria, Wahyudi Sutopo, Muhammad Hisjam and Djoni Hartono, 'Scenario Analysis of Subsidy Policies on Electric Motorcycle Market in Indonesia Using System Dynamics Simulation', *Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, 32 (2025), 101487 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trip.2025.101487>
- Riyanto, Geger, 'Cultivating Extractive Bodies: Labor Frontiers and the Social Reproduction of Nickel Workers in North Maluku, Indonesia', *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 28 (2026), 101968 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2026.101968>
- Rochmad, Rochmad and Raden Ariel Andro Bramasta, 'Prevention of Theft with Aggravated Circumstances at Semarang City', *Indonesian Journal of Advocacy and Legal Services*, 5 (2023), 81 – 117 <https://doi.org/10.15294/ijals.v5i1.66854>
- Rofingi, Umi Rozah and Adifyan Rahmat Asga, 'Problems of Law Enforcement in Realizing The Principle of Equality Before The Law in Indonesia', *Law Reform: Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum*, 18 (2022), 222 – 237 <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v18i2.47477>
- Van Roosbroek, Steven and Steven Van de Walle, 'The Relationship between Ombudsman, Government, and Citizens: A Survey Analysis', *Negotiation Journal*, 24 (2008), 287-302 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00185.x>
- Rosadi, Barkah, An Nisa Diana, Putera Ramadhan, Agis Trias Pajar Balino, Yandi Sopian and Wieldha Sartika, 'THE EFFECT OF SAFETY UNIT COMPETENCY OF SERVICE PERFORMANCE IN THE GEOLOGICAL SECRETARIAT OF THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES; [PENGARUH KOMPETENSI SATUAN PENGAMANAN TERHADAP KINERJA PELAYANAN PADA SEKRETARIAT BADAN GEOLOGI KEMENTERIAN ENERGI ', *Res Militaris*, 13 (2023), 10 – 28

<https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85141420642&partnerID=40&md5=be357364036f5abd28bf94731023c872>

- Sajida, Sajida, 'The Expansion of Military Influence in Indonesia's Governance: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse Analysis of Media Narratives', *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 13 (2026), 102428 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2025.102428>
- Saputra, Irfan, Fatwa Faturachmat, Andi Vika Faradiba Muin, Nurhady Sirimorok and Muhammad Alif K Sahide, 'Sequencing the Political Forest: Power, Exclusion, and the Corporate Hijacking of Social Forestry in Indonesia', *Forest Policy and Economics*, 181 (2025), 103668 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2025.103668>
- Satrya, Wahyu Fadli, Ria Aprilliyani and Emny Harna Yossy, 'Sentiment Analysis of Indonesian Police Chief Using Multi-Level Ensemble Model', *Procedia Computer Science*, 216 (2023), 620–29 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2022.12.177>
- Scott, David J, 'Understanding and Coping with Complaints: A Clinician's View', *Current Paediatrics*, 13 (2003), 376–81 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0957-5839\(03\)00059-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0957-5839(03)00059-9)
- Sena Utama, Wildan, 'Politics and Governance in Indonesia. The Police in the Era of Reformasi, Written by Muradi', *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia*, 171 (2015), 593–95 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17104017>
- Setyonugroho, Gregorius Agung, Norio Maki, Yoshihisha Wakita, Yasushi Takeuchi and Shushuke Aritoshi, 'Leveraging Past Recovery Strategy for Future Policy Implementation: Post-2018 Earthquake Residential Housing Reconstruction in Bayan Timur Hamlet, Lombok, Indonesia', *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 141 (2026), 106179 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdr.2026.106179>
- Shohibuddin, Mohamad, Arya H Dharmawan, Endriatmo Soetarto, Lala M Kolopaking and Nirzalin, 'The Politics of Invisibility: Everyday Extractive Violence and the Silencing of Agrarian Claims in the Bogor Bentonite Complex, Indonesia', *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 28 (2026), 102025 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2026.102025>
- Shukla, Surinder K, 'Conflict Management and Resolution', in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict* (Elsevier, 2022), pp. 213–24 <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-820195-4.00164-3>
- Siregar, Sarah Nuraini, 'Politicised Policing in Indonesia: A Study of the Indonesian National Police during the 2019 Presidential Election', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 33 (2025), 654 – 672 <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2025.2500005>
- Smith, Graham, 'Every Complaint Matters: Human Rights Commissioner's Opinion Concerning Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints against the Police', *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 38 (2010), 59–74 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcrj.2010.03.001>

- Smith, Jonathan Davis, Martha Hesty Susilowati, Samsul Maarif and Eko Cahyono, 'When Energy Transitions Drive Polarization: Narratives of Green Energy and Mitigation Strategies by Proponents and Opponents of Geothermal Energy Developments in Indonesia', *Energy Policy*, 210 (2026), 115080 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115080>
- Soegiantoro, Didiek Hardiyanto, Fortunata Narwadan, Joyce Nadia Clarita Ndruru, Oktaviana Koa, Yunita Susanti Mahemba, Betriks Utang Palunggu, and others, 'Public Perceptions of Community Pharmacists' Evolving Role in Health Promotion and Pharmaceutical Care: A Cross-Sectional Study in Indonesia', *Currents in Pharmacy Teaching and Learning*, 18 (2026), 102600 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cptl.2026.102600>
- Soleh, Muchammad, Andy Indradjad, Shinta Rahma Diana, Abdul Asyiri and Ratna Pertiwi, 'Economic Value of near Real-Time Hotspot Data Products for Indonesian Forest and Land Fire Monitoring', *Kuwait Journal of Science*, 53 (2026), 100585 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjs.2026.100585>
- Suastuti, Eny, Lalu Muhammad Hayyanul Haq, Yudi Widagdo Harimurti and Deni Setya Bagus Yuherawana, 'TRANSFORMATION AND EFFECTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION ON DETERMINING CORRUPTION SUSPECTS AS A PRETRIAL OBJECT UNDER THE INDONESIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM', *Lex Scientia Law Review*, 8 (2024), 817 – 858 <https://doi.org/10.15294/lslr.v8i2.14667>
- Sumiati, Siti and Verri Dwi Prasetyo, 'Transformational Performance of Police of the Republic of Indonesia Through Smart Working', *Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems*, 497 LNNS (2022), 325 – 336 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08812-4_31
- Suprihanto, Eko, Yos Johan Utama and Irma Cahyaningtyas, 'Reformulasi Pemberantasan Korupsi Di Indonesia: Perspektif Kepolisian Menghadapi Korupsi Sebagai Ancaman Perang Proksi', *Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia*, 5 (2023), 204 – 219 <https://doi.org/10.14710/jphi.v5i1.204-219>
- Susilo, Dwidjo, Luh Putu Lila Wulandari, Evi Sukmayeti, Augustine Asante, Stephen Jan, Hasbullah Thabrany, and others, 'Can Indonesia Achieve Universal Health Coverage? Organisational and Financing Challenges in Implementing the National Health Insurance System', *SSM - Health Systems*, 5 (2025), 100138 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmhs.2025.100138>
- Tias, Pisca A, Constance L McDermott and Mari E Mulyani, 'Navigating the Nexus between Customary Norms and State Laws in Shaping Rural Forest Governance: A Case Study in Aceh Province, Indonesia', *Forest Policy and Economics*, 182 (2026), 103672 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2025.103672>
- Tirtaningtyas, Fransisca Noni, 'Influences of Human Activities on Seabird Populations: Case Example from Jakarta Bay, Indonesia', in *Encyclopedia of the Anthropocene (Second Edition)*, ed. by Michael I Goldstein, Scott A Elias, and Mark John Costello, Second Edition (London: Elsevier, 2026), pp. 369–80 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-443->

14082-2.00068-5

- Toyibah, Dzuriyatun and Irma Riyani, 'Contesting Religious Authority in Response to Government Regulations on the Prevention and Handling of Campus Sexual Violence (CSV) in Indonesia', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 110 (2025), 103085 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2025.103085>
- Tyler, Tom R, *Why People Obey the Law, Why People Obey the Law*, 2021 <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1j66769>
- Waters, Ian and Katie Brown, 'Police Complaints and the Complainants' Experience', *British Journal of Criminology*, 40 (2000), 617 – 638 <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/40.4.617>
- Wulandari, Ratna Dwi, Agung Dwi Laksono, Zuardin Zuardin, Nikmatur Rohmah and Maznah Dahlui, 'Socioeconomic Disparities in Primary Healthcare Utilization in Eastern Indonesia', *Clinical Epidemiology and Global Health*, 35 (2025), 102154 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cegh.2025.102154>
- Young, Richard, Carolyn Hoyle, Karen Cooper and Roderick Hill, 'Informal Resolution of Complaints against the Police: A Quasi-Experimental Test of Restorative Justice', *Criminal Justice*, 5 (2005), 279 – 317 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1466802505055837>